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PREVIEW; State v. Staker: The Constitutionality of 
Undercover Law Enforcement Text Message Conversations with 
Potential Suspects 
Forrest Crowl* 
 The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral 
arguments in the matter of State of Montana v. Travis Staker on 
Friday, March 26, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. Oral arguments will be 
conducted entirely by visual and audio communication devices on 
Zoom, live-streamed through the Court’s website at 
http://stream.vision.net/MT-JUD/, with an introduction to the oral 
arguments beginning at 9:00 a.m. Mark J. Luebeck will likely 
appear on behalf of Appellant Travis Staker (“Staker”), and Mardell 
Ployhar will likely appear on behalf of Appellee the State of 
Montana (“State”).  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The primary issues before the Montana Supreme Court are 
whether Staker has an actual subjective expectation of privacy in his 
cell phone text message communications and whether society is 
willing to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable. The 
Court’s decision will clarify whether a warrant is required for an 
undercover law enforcement officer to engage in text message 
conversations with a potential suspect. This decision will potentially 
clarify the extent of privacy rights in text message conversations 
between private citizens and undercover law enforcement agents. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 During the last week of August 2018, Special Agent Rodney 
Noe, from the Department of Homeland Security, posted an 
advertisement on Internet websites advertising an “experience” with 
an individual named “Lily.”1 The advertisement provided 
individuals with an email address and a phone number that could be 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of 
Montana, Class of 2022. 
1 Brief of Appellant at 3–4, State v. Staker, (Mont. Apr. 4, 2020) (No. 19-0731). 
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used to contact “Lily.”2 Agent Noe possessed the cell phone that 
received and responded to inquiries related to the advertisement.3 
Agent Noe, acting in an undercover capacity as “Lily,” began text 
messaging individuals who responded to the advertisement.4 
 On August 27, 2018, Agent Noe received a text message 
from Staker’s cell phone.5 Staker and “Lily” engaged in a text 
message conversation where Staker arranged to meet “Lily” at a 
Bozeman hotel and pay her in exchange for sexual intercourse.6 The 
parties stipulated that abbreviations Staker used in the text messages 
with “Lily” were consistent with common abbreviations used in the 
sex trade.7 On August 29, 2018, when Staker arrived at the hotel, he 
was arrested and charged with misdemeanor prostitution in violation 
of Montana Code Annotated § 45–5–601.8 The State did not seek or 
obtain a search warrant during the course of its investigation of 
Staker.9 
 In Gallatin County Justice Court, Staker was granted his 
motion to suppress the evidence of the text messages he sent to 
Agent Noe on the ground that the officer’s recording of the text 
messages violated Staker’s right to privacy under Article II, Sections 
10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution.10 The State appealed the 
justice court’s decision to the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, 
where Staker again moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
without a warrant by Agent Noe.11 On September 17, 2019, the 
district court denied Staker’s motion to suppress, concluding: 
“Agent Noe did not engage in a search or seizure of the text 
 
2 Brief of Appellee at 2–3, State v. Staker, (Mont. Sept. 25, 2020) (No. 19-0731). 
3 Id. at 3. 
4 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 4. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 4–7.   
7 Id. at 6. 
8 Id. at 1, 8; see generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–601 (“[T]he offense of 
prostitution is committed if a person engages in or agrees or offers to engage in 
sexual intercourse or sexual contact that is direct and not through clothing with 
another person for compensation, whether the compensation is received or to be 
received or paid or to be paid.”).  
9 Id. at 9.  
10 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1; see generally MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 
(“The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society 
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”); 
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
11 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 1. 
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exchange with [Staker].”12 Staker subsequently entered a guilty plea 
to the charge of prostitution and reserved his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress.13 This appeal followed Staker’s 
sentencing.14 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellant Travis Staker 
 
 Staker primarily argues that Agent Noe’s warrantless 
investigation constituted an illegal search and seizure, as Staker had 
an actual subjective expectation of privacy in his text messages and 
society recognizes his expectation as objectively reasonable.15 
Staker relies on the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution, 
which protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.16 
Staker contends this case must be decided under Article II, Sections 
10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution.17 Specifically, he argues, all 
three factors used by Montana courts to determine whether a state 
actor’s search or seizure violates the Montana Constitution are met 
here.18 
 First, Staker claims he had an actual subjective expectation 
of privacy in his cell phone text messages with “Lily.”19 Staker 
characterizes his text messages to Agent Noe as “written thoughts,” 
and maintains he had a subjective expectation of privacy that his 
thoughts were communicated to a private person, not a government 
agent.20 Staker relies on the following facts to show he had an actual 
subjective expectation of privacy: he did not text publicly with 
 
12 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.  
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 10. 
16 Id.  
17 Reply Brief of Appellant at 11–19, State v. Staker, (Mont. Nov. 9, 2020) (No. 
19-0731).  
18 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 12; see generally State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 
489, 497–98 (Mont. 2008) (“1) whether the person challenging the state’s action 
has an actual subjective expectation of privacy; 2) whether society is willing to 
recognize that subjective expectation as objectively reasonable; and 3) the nature 
of the state’s intrusion.”). 
19 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 17.  
20 Id. at 17–18. 
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“Lily”; he did not share their text messages with anyone and only 
they had access to those conversations; they communicated using 
acronyms and vague terms; he password protected his cell phone, 
which only he had the ability to unlock; and he kept his cell phone 
in his possession at all times and did not loan it to others.21  
 Next, Staker argues society recognizes his actual subjective 
expectation of privacy in his text messages as reasonable.22 Here, 
Staker cites to the prevalence of cell phones and society’s attitudes 
toward cell phone privacy.23 Staker asserts if society recognizes an 
individual’s expectation of privacy in their face-to-face 
conversations, cell phone and landline voice conversations, 
Facebook/cell phone messages, and physical movements, society 
also recognizes Staker’s expectation of privacy in his text messages 
with “Lily.”24 
 Lastly, Staker argues the State’s warrantless search and 
seizure was per se unreasonable because the State lacked a 
recognized search warrant exception.25 Staker claims the 
appropriate remedy for the State’s unlawful actions is to suppress all 
the evidence gathered as a result of the search, including text 
messages between Staker and Agent Noe, and all testimonial 
evidence regarding the communication.26 
 
 
 
21 Id. at 18–19. 
22 Id. at 21. 
23 Id. at 22–25 (citing Charles MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, 
Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
59 (2014); Frank Newport, The New Era of Communication Among Americans, 
GALLUP (Nov. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/29XD-LHCR; Aaron Smith, 
Americans and Text Messaging, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 19, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/S5UP-2M5H; Dustin Volz, Most Americans Unwilling to Give 
Up Privacy to Thwart Attacks: Reuters/Ipsos Poll, THOMSON REUTERS (Apr. 4, 
2017), https://perma.cc/4D5Q-3MXD; Matthew Weber, Reuters Graphics, 
THOMSON REUTERS/ISPOS (2017), https://perma.cc/3UD3-CK94.).  
24 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 31 (citing State v. Stewart, 291 P.3d 1187 
(Mont. 2012); State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010); State v. Goetz, 191 
P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008); State v. Windham, Montana Eighteenth Judicial District 
Court, Cause No. DC-13-118C, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Supporting January 29, 2015 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 
and Dismiss (Feb. 5, 2015)).  
25 Id. at 43. 
26 Id. at 44. 
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B. Appellee State of Montana 
 
 The State primarily argues Staker’s text messages to Agent 
Noe are not protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution or Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana 
Constitution.27 The State contends Staker does not have a privacy 
interest in the text messages he voluntarily sent to the undercover 
officer.28 
 First, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the State argues 
that once Staker disclosed information to another person, he no 
longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.29 
The State relies heavily on the third-party doctrine, arguing Staker’s 
voluntary response to an unknown party via an online advertisement 
demonstrates he assumed the risk the recipient would be—or would 
share his text messages with—a law enforcement officer.30 The 
State asserts Staker’s cell phone was not searched; instead, Staker 
sent a text message to a government agent, believing the agent was 
a prostitute.31 
 Next, the State argues Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the 
Montana Constitution do not protect text messages Staker sent to an 
undercover law enforcement officer.32 The State maintains that, 
although the Montana Constitution offers an enhanced privacy right 
that guards against warrantless electronic monitoring and 
surreptitious recording, neither of those investigatory means were 
used in this case.33 Specifically, the State contends the right to 
privacy under the Montana Constitution does not protect the text 
messages Staker sent to an undercover law enforcement officer.34 
The State distinguishes Staker from prior Montana case law 
involving telephonic conversations and recordings, claiming text 
 
27 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 9. 
28 Id. at 26–27. 
29 Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“It is 
well settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he 
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, 
and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of 
that information.”).  
30 Id. at 13–19. 
31 Id. at 19.  
32 Id. at 20. 
33 Id. at 20–21.  
34 Id. at 26. 
2021  PREVIEW: STATE V. STAKER  91
messages, by their very nature, create a recording in the sender’s and 
the recipient’s cell phone.35 The State asserts it is common 
knowledge that a person receiving a text message could be a law 
enforcement officer or could share the message with anyone, 
including law enforcement.36 
 Even if Staker had a subjective expectation of privacy, the 
State argues society would not view that expectation as objectively 
reasonable.37 The State asserts, regardless of what Staker did with 
his cell phone, he had to know the messages he sent to a number in 
an advertisement would be contained in the recipient’s phone and 
the recipient could do anything they wanted with those messages.38 
Essentially, the State does not believe it is reasonable for a person 
to expect a written electronic communication sent to a complete 
stranger in response to an advertisement for illegal services would 
remain private.39 
 Finally, the State requests the Court to decline Staker’s 
invitation to dramatically expand Montana’s right to privacy, 
because it would prohibit law enforcement conduct that has 
routinely been accepted and drastically hinder law enforcement’s 
ability to perform investigations.40 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
 To review a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, the 
Court will determine whether the district court’s findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous and whether the district court’s interpretation and 
application of law are correct.41 First, the Court will need to 
determine if a search occurred. The Court will likely find Staker did 
not have an actual subjective expectation of privacy in his text 
messages, and even if he did, society is not willing to recognize that 
expectation as objectively reasonable. Therefore, the Court will 
likely uphold the denial of Staker’s motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained by law enforcement in their investigation. 
 
35 Id. at 26–27. 
36 Id. at 28. 
37 Id. at 29. 
38 Id. at 30. 
39 Id. at 31–32. 
40 Id. at 32. 
41 State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489, 493 (Mont. 2008). 
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 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”42 The Montana Constitution 
affords citizens an even greater right to privacy than the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.43 Pursuant to Article 
II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution, and State v. 
Goetz44 and its progeny, Montana citizens enjoy a heightened 
privacy right. Further, even the delegates to the 1972 Montana 
Constitutional Convention were concerned with future potential 
intrusions by the government into Montanan’s privacy by using 
electronic monitoring and surveillance.45 A search occurs when an 
individual has exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy 
and the individual’s expectation of privacy is one that society is 
prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable.46 In Montana, a 
state action constitutes an “unreasonable” or “unlawful” search of 
the individual if the first two factors above are met and the nature of 
the state’s intrusion is unreasonable.47 
 
A. Staker’s Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
 
 The Court must first address whether Staker had an actual 
subjective expectation of privacy in his text messages with Agent 
Noe. A significant portion of oral argument will likely be dedicated 
to this question. A split of authority exists in Montana’s Eighteenth 
Judicial District Court as to whether law enforcement must obtain a 
search warrant before engaging in electronic communication with a 
suspect. The Court in State v. Beam48 found the defendant had no 
actual subjective expectation of privacy in his Facebook messages 
 
42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
43 Goetz, 191 P.3d at 494. 
44 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008). 
45 Id. at 499–500 (citing Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim 
Transcript, March 7, 1972 at 1682, 1687). 
46 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
47 Goetz, 191 P.3d at 497–98. 
48 Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Cause No. DC-12-161B, Findings 
of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order (Apr. 10, 2013).  
2021  PREVIEW: STATE V. STAKER  93
with an undercover detective.49 While State v. Windham50 found a 
defendant had an actual subjective expectation of privacy in their 
Facebook and text communications with an undercover detective 
posing as a 16-year-old high school student.51 The Court’s holding 
in Staker should clarify the contradictory authority found in 
Montana’s Eighteenth Judicial District Court.  
 Here, it is likely the Court upholds the district court’s 
rulings, following similar reasoning as the district court, even with 
the heightened principles supporting Montanan’s right to privacy in 
mind. The State’s third-party doctrine argument is compelling when 
paired with the district court’s conclusion that sending written text 
messages to another person is different from the nature of oral 
communications that were the subject of prior case law Staker 
cites.52 The Montana Supreme Court’s analyses in State v. Stewart53 
and State v. Allen54 ostensibly recognize the application of the third-
party doctrine. The United States Supreme Court has generally held 
“when an individual reveals private information to another, he 
assumes the risk that his confident will reveal that information to the 
authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit governmental use of that information.”55 It is difficult to see 
how the third-party doctrine, which essentially waives a person’s 
privacy right, does not apply here. Staker sent text messages to a 
stranger he found on an Internet advertisement and thus took the risk 
the recipient would be—or would share his text messages with—a 
law enforcement officer.  
 
49 Id.  
50 Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Cause No. DC-13-118C, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Supporting January 29, 2015 Order Granting 
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and Dismiss (Feb. 5, 2015).  
51 Id.  
52 See Goetz, 191 P.3d at 504 (holding electronic monitoring and recording of 
defendant’s conversations with a confidential informant, constituted searches 
subject to the warrant requirement); State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045, 1061 (Mont. 
2010) (holding the recording of a cell phone conversation at the behest of law 
enforcement constituted a search); State v. Stewart, 291 P.3d 1187, 1201 (Mont. 
2012) (holding a warrantless search occurred when a detective surreptitiously 
recorded the landline/cell phone conversations between the defendant and his 
daughter).  
53 291 P.3d 1187 (Mont. 2012).  
54 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010).  
55 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).  
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  Also, the Montana Supreme Court could consider 
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, which have held a 
“[d]efendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
[text] messages he willingly, and without undue government 
prompting, sent to the undercover officers.”56 Staker willingly, and 
without undue government prompting, sent text messages to Agent 
Noe, and therefore, likely did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in his text messages.   
 Staker’s attempt to establish an actual subjective expectation 
of privacy hinges on his cell phone usage and how he guarded the 
conversations he had with “Lily.”57 However, regardless of how 
carefully Staker guarded his actual cell phone and the content within 
the cell phone, his expectation of privacy likely terminated upon 
delivery of the text message. The Court will likely distinguish text 
message conversations from recorded oral conversations, much like 
the State did in their brief.58 The district court in Staker relied, in 
part, on Allen, and the fact that Allen did not know his conversation 
with the informant was being recorded.59 Staker is in a much 
different situation than Allen, Staker likely knew or should have 
known his text message conversation was recorded and 
memorialized in written form. Regardless of the steps Staker took to 
guard the privacy of his cell phone, the Fourth Amendment provides 
no protection to “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to 
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”60 
Staker accepted the risk, when he sent the text message to a phone 
number found on an Internet advertisement, that the message could 
be obtained by law enforcement. Therefore, the Court will likely 
conclude Staker did not have a subjective expectation of privacy. 
 
 
56 United States v. Mack, 53 F. Supp. 3d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2014). 
57 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 18–19. Staker partially relies on a non-
controlling case, State v. Windham, Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, 
Cause No. DC-13-118C, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Supporting 
January 29, 2015 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress and Dismiss 
(Feb. 5, 2015), where an undercover law enforcement officer engaged in a 
Facebook message conversation with Windham. The Court found Windham had 
an actual expectation of privacy in his Facebook messaging account and society 
would find that expectation as reasonable. 
58 Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 26. 
59 Id. at 28. 
60 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).  
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B. Society’s Willingness to Recognize the Subjective Expectation 
as Objectively Reasonable 
 
 Even if the Court were to find an actual subjective 
expectation of privacy in Staker’s text messages with Agent Noe, it 
is not likely to find society is willing to accept that expectation as 
objectively reasonable. In Goetz and Stewart, the Court recognized 
Montanans have an expectation of privacy that prevents law 
enforcement from monitoring and recording conversations; 
however, they do not have an expectation of privacy in the content 
of their conversations because nothing precludes the listener from 
repeating what was said.61 
 Again, regardless of what Staker did with his cell phone, he 
knew the messages would be contained in the recipient’s cell phone 
and the recipient could do anything they wanted with those 
messages. Staker goes into detail on the prevalence of cell phone use 
today to show that society is willing to accept a subjective 
expectation of privacy in text messages as objectively reasonable.62 
It is undisputed cell phone usage is at an all-time high and will likely 
continue to grow in prevalence every year. However, cell phone use, 
and an individual’s expectation of privacy in their cell phone, is 
different from the expectation of privacy in text messages sent to 
another individual from their cell phone. Staker’s control over the 
content of the text message expires upon delivery, a concept that has 
been discussed and analyzed in recent years due to increased cell 
phone ownership and use.63 It is important to emphasize, Staker’s 
actual cell phone was not searched without a warrant. 
 While Staker persuasively looks to public policy, set by the 
Montana legislature through enactment of statutes, to support his 
claim that society would view his subjective expectation of privacy 
as objectively reasonable, the public policy Staker relies on can be 
distinguished from the facts in Staker. Staker points out, in recent 
years, the Montana legislature has addressed societal privacy 
 
61 State v. Stewart, 291 P.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (Mont. 2012); State v. Goetz, 191 
P.3d 489, 500 (Mont. 2008). 
62 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 22–25. 
63 See, e.g., State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 58 (R.I. 2014) (holding the defendant 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages contained 
in his girlfriend’s phone).  
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concerns related to modern electronic data.64 Those statutes deal 
primarily with the prohibition of government entities utilizing 
electronic devices to access protected information found within an 
individual’s personal device. But here, the State did not invade 
Staker’s personal device to get incriminating information. Staker 
provided the incriminating information to law enforcement when he 
sent the text messages to “Lily.” 
 Therefore, if the Court reaches the second prong of the test, 
it will likely conclude that society is not willing to recognize 
Staker’s expectation of privacy in his text messages to Agent Noe 
as objectively reasonable. 
 
C. Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ Brief of 
Amicus Curiae 
 
 Lastly, the Montana Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (“MTACDL”) filed a Brief of Amicus Curiae essentially 
arguing law enforcement could have, and should have, obtained an 
anticipatory warrant65 to render their actions constitutional.66 Since 
the Court is not likely to conclude that a search occurred, it will 
likely not address the MTACDL’s claims. However, if the Court 
does reach the issue, it will likely find that anticipatory warrants may 
have been used in this situation, not that one must have been used. 
Ultimately, while the MTACDL’s attempt to persuade the Court to 
adopt anticipatory warrants has merit, because the Court will likely 
find no search occurred, no warrant would have been needed by law 
enforcement, and therefore, anticipatory warrants are not required. 
 
 
 
 
64 See generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-110 (prohibiting government entities 
from obtaining from electronic devices location information, without a search 
warrant); § 46-5-112 (prohibiting government entities from obtaining from 
electronic devices stored data, without a search warrant); § 46-5-117 (restricting 
governmental use of license plate readers).    
65 “An anticipatory warrant is ‘a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable 
cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of a crime will 
be located in a specific place.’” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 94 (2006) 
(citing and quoting 2. W. LeFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), p. 398 (4th ed. 
2004)). 
66 Brief of Amicus Curiae – Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
State v. Staker, (Mont. May 9, 2020) (No. 19-0731).  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Montanans have an expectation that their oral 
communications will not be recorded; however, they do not have 
that same belief or guarantee that text messages, emails, or Internet 
chats will not be recorded, because, by their very nature, those 
communications are recorded. Therefore, it is unlikely the Court 
will find an actual subjective expectation of privacy in Staker’s 
communications with Agent Noe and even more unlikely the Court 
will find society’s willingness to recognize that expectation as 
objectively reasonable. It is unlikely the Court in Staker will extend 
the reasoning of privacy in oral communications to written text 
communications voluntarily sent by a defendant to law enforcement. 
Therefore, the Court will likely uphold the district court’s denial of 
Staker’s motion to suppress.   
 
